Abstract
Introductory Remarks
The relationship between a state and individuals who appear to act for this same state has been examined under the microscope of international law, through many different lenses. What the eye of the scholar has beheld has been coloured by the purpose for which the specimen on the slide has been examined, and the relationship has consequently been described in a number of different ways. The aim of such examinations has been to develop legal tests with specific purposes: a test to determine which rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) apply to an individual (the focus of this article); a test to determine if a state is responsible for the actions of the individuals concerned; a test to determine if what may at first appear to be an non-international armed conflict has in fact become 'internationalized'; a test to determine if a state's human rights law obligations extend to the actions of the individuals acting under the state's control.
These various tests formulated to apply to this same relationship have provoked a number of concerns among scholars, two of which will be raised here.
One concern is what is the appropriate test to apply in a particular situation where there appear to be conflicting views about the correct test to apply. The celebrated examples on point are the conflicting tests formulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case 1 and by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić case 2 for the purpose of attributing state responsibility. The ICTY was called upon to classify an armed conflict for the purpose of determining the ratione materiae of applicable crimes in order to proceed with an analysis of individual criminal responsibility. In classifying the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as having been 'internationalized' by the involvement of an outside state in what would otherwise be a non-international armed conflict, the ICTY relied upon the 1986 judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ had articulated a test for determining state responsibility based on the criterion of 'effective control' of a state over an armed group. Admittedly, the issues before the ICJ in the Nicaragua case were very different from those faced by the ICTY: the former was concerned with issues of state responsibility and did not have to classify an armed conflict; the latter was charged with addressing issues of individual criminal responsibility where the classification of the armed conflict was vital to determining the applicable law with which to try the accused. The ICTY Appeals Chamber nevertheless found the ICJ decision to be a stimulating precursor, but not reflective of customary international law,report headed by Martti Koskenniemi, cited the different tests formulated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case and the ICJ in the Nicaragua case as demonstrative of 'fragmentation through conflicting interpretations of general law'. 5 The judicial dialogue -or, as Judge Bruno Simma has called it, the 'dialogue des sourds' 6 -between the ICJ and the ICTY continued with the ICJ responding to the Tadić case in 2007 by reasserting the applicability of its Nicaragua test of 'effective control' for the purpose of determining state responsibility in the Genocide case. 7 The ICJ attempted to diffuse any perceived fragmentation by pointing out the different purposes that the conflicting tests serve. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins noted in her speech as President of the ICJ in 2007, in the Genocide case 'the International Court clearly addressed this perceived fracture in the jurisprudence and demonstrated that its significance should not be inflated '. 8 A second concern which has arisen with respect to the relationship between a state and the individuals who appear to act for this same state is the very fact that different tests with their respective different purposes have been developed to describe this relationship. This proliferation of different tests has perplexed some scholars. Theoretical problems have been fashioned out of considerations of how these different tests interrelate, such as how the test of 'effective control' which has been developed for the purpose of attributing state responsibility relates to the test of 'overall control' developed for the purpose of classifying an armed conflict as having become 'internationalized'. For example, some scholars have been troubled by the fact that an application of the 'overall control' test articulated for the purpose of classifying an armed conflict under IHL would lead to the result that a state may not incur responsibility for violations committed by some individuals fighting on its behalf, because the test of 'effective control' for attributing state responsibility is more difficult to establish than the test for determining whether a non-international armed conflict has become 'internationalized'. In this vein, one author has asked whether it is 'possible to regard a state as a party to an armed conflict although no acts of the persons involved in the fighting are attributable to it? '. 9 The two different concerns outlined above will be addressed in this article through the vehicle of one of the tests which applies to the relationship between a state and ', 25 Michigan J Int'l L (2004) 929, at 957-958. 6 Simma, supra note 3, at 280. Spinedi, 'On the Non-Attribution of the Bosnian Serbs' Conduct to Serbia', 5 J Int'l Criminal Justice (2007) 829, at 832. She concludes, at 836, that '[a] lthough the issue would need to be further explored, it seems indisputable that this view could be maintained '. individuals who appear to be acting for this same state. The focus of this article is the test of 'belonging to a party' to an international armed conflict for the purpose of classifying individuals under IHL.
10 This is a test which, unlike the tests set out in the Tadić and Nicaragua cases, or the test formulated for determining the applicability of human rights treaties, 11 is rarely discussed, despite its important role in determining the application of IHL rules to individuals in the context of international armed conflicts. The 'belonging' test merits clarification as it appears to have been misinterpreted by the ICTY in the Tadić case, when the Appeals Chamber classified the armed conflict as having become internationalized. Furthermore, a discussion of the 'belonging test' can assist in unravelling the legal reasoning of the ICTY in the Tadić case, and can form the basis of a robust critique of the use of the test in Nicaragua by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. Clarification of the 'belonging test' is thus also a useful contribution to broader debates concerning the perceived fragmentation of international law.
In setting out the test to apply to determine whether an individual 'belongs to a party' to an international armed conflict, this article will incorporate responses to the two concerns outlined above. With respect to the first concern about the existence of conflicting tests, it will be argued that not only was the ICTY not called upon to address issues of state responsibility in the Tadić case, but the very fact that it examined the test formulated in the Nicaragua case at all is problematic. The approach taken by many scholars in citing the application of the Nicaragua test by the ICTY as evidence of the 'fragmentation through conflicting interpretations of general law' should not blunt the prickly truth that this was an erroneous application 'tout court'. As Theodor Meron noted over a decade ago, with respect to the ICTY Trial Chamber's examination of the Nicaragua test in the Tadić case: the problem in the trial chamber's approach lay not in its interpretation of Nicaragua, but in applying Nicaragua to Tadić at all. Obviously, the Nicaragua test addresses only the question of state responsibility. Conceptually, it cannot determine whether a conflict is international or internal.
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As will be argued in this article, it was the ICTY Appeal Chamber's misuse of the 'belonging test' that led to the unnecessary examination of state responsibility, and the erroneous application of the Nicaragua test.
With respect to the second concern outlined above, regarding the proliferation of different tests and how these tests interrelate, this is not a concern manifested in practice, and although considerations of how different tests interrelate is theoretically interesting, it is not at all problematic. Each test which has been formulated serves a very specific purpose, sometimes in relation to a particular area of international law such as IHL or human rights. at New York University on May 4, 2010 would rather be worrying if, in order to apply the rules of IHL of international armed conflict to a particular individual, it was first necessary to establish that the actions of this individual could be attributed to a state which consequently incurred responsibility for his or her actions.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, the requirement of 'belonging' is discussed in section 2. It is argued that, bearing in mind the purpose of this requirement, 'belonging' under IHL should amount to nothing more than a de facto agreement between a state and a group of individuals to the effect that the latter fight on the state's behalf. It is essential to consider the 'belonging' requirement before re-examining the ICTY Appeal Chamber's Tadić judgment in section 3 in order to analyse this well-known judgment with fresh eyes. Section 3 will criticize the ICTY for assuming that the belonging requirement amounts to a test for establishing state responsibility. Finally, in section 4 it will be shown that, unlike the assumption of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić judgment, it is not necessarily the case that a state will incur responsibility for the actions of an individual who fights for this same state in an international armed conflict. This fourth section will examine how a state may only in certain situations be responsible for the actions of individuals who 'belong' to it, in accordance with the rules of attribution for establishing state responsibility, and on the basis of due diligence.
Test of 'Belonging to a Party' to an International Armed Conflict
Suppose the following description is reflective of a group of individuals captured in the context of an international armed conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and another state: 'one of the newest groups to emerge [in the DRC] is called the Rastas, a mysterious gang of dreadlocked fugitives who live deep in the forest, wear shiny tracksuits and Los Angeles Lakers jerseys and are notorious for burning babies, kidnapping women and literally chopping up anybody who gets in their way '. 13 Could such a group of individuals be regarded as prisoners of war (POWs) under IHL in accordance with the requirements set out under Article 4A (2) The 'belonging to a Party' requirement is pivotal to the definition of a POW and, before surrender or capture, a combatant. As has been aptly noted, 'combatant . . . is a term of art. It does not apply as it would in a lay sense to anyone who is engaged in fighting. When in common parlance we say somebody is engaged in combat, we just mean someone who is fighting. In humanitarian law [of international armed conflicts], however, a combatant specifically identifies someone who is fighting on behalf of the state.'
16 It is thus the requirement which immediately distinguishes between (i) those individuals fighting on behalf of a state party to the armed conflict, and who are thus participating in the international armed conflict as 'combatants', 17 and (ii) those individuals who are simply fighting on a territory where an international armed conflict is taking place, but who are not fighting on behalf of a state party to the conflict, and are thus not fighting as 'combatants'.
In addition to the criteria for POW/combatant status contained in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, there are three other types of combatant deduced from the categories of persons described as POWs under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 18 Unlike those in Article 4A(2), these other categories of combatants need not expressly demonstrate that they fulfil the 'belonging' criterion. Armed forces, including 'militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces' under Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention constitute the armed forces of a state party to an international armed conflict. The 'belonging' requirement is thus implicit for these individuals because the fact that they constitute the state's armed forces means that they are fighting on behalf of that state. Similarly, combatants under Article 4A(3) of the Third Geneva Convention also implicitly fulfil the 'belonging' requirement as they too are members of the armed forces of a state, even though the government of this state is not recognized by the adverse state party to the conflict. Lastly, the rather exceptional situation of a levée en masse requires only that those fighting to demonstrate that they are inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who spontaneously take 15 'l'appartenance à une Partie au conflit' in the French version. Assuming such individuals also fulfil the other requirements under Art. 4A(2) Third Geneva Convention.
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Six different types of individuals are described under Art. 4A Third Geneva Convention as qualifying for POW status, but only individuals falling within 4 of these categories also have, prior to capture or surrender, combatant status in the conduct of hostilities.
at New York University on May 4, 2010 up arms to resist the invading armed forces, provided that they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
'Belonging' to a state party to the conflict is thus a criterion that needs only be expressly demonstrated by combatants falling under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention: the members of other militia and volunteer corps, including armed resistance groups. These individuals should not to be confused with the 'members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of . . . [the] armed forces' (emphasis added) of a party to the conflict pursuant to Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention. Unlike those persons falling under Article 4A(1), individuals falling under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention do not form part of the regular armed forces of a state party to an international armed conflict.
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What is sufficient to demonstrate that an armed group 'belongs' to a state party to the armed conflict?
One approach to answering this question, the approach favoured in this article, is to say that a low-threshold requirement is sufficient to be considered to 'belong'. According to this approach, 'belonging to a party to a conflict' would amount to an analysis of the motivation or intention of the armed group and the reaction of the state concerned: is the armed group fighting for the state, and does the state -either expressly or tacitly -accept that the group is fighting on its behalf? This interpretation is supported by the commentary to Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, in relation to Article 4B where the wording 'belonging' also appears. According to this commentary, since the conclusion of the Hague Conferences, resistance movements have been considered to fight on behalf of a party to the conflict simply if there is a de facto relationship with this party. A de facto relationship may find expression merely by tacit agreement.
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This 'de facto relationship' has been described by one author as 'support' or 'allegiance' displayed by the militia/volunteer corps towards the state party to the conflict which is accepted expressly or tacitly by the latter. 'Resistance movements must be fighting on behalf of a "Party to the conflict" in the sense of Article 2 [common to the Geneva Conventions] . . . since such militias and volunteer corps are not entitled to style themselves a "Party to the conflict". International law has advanced considerably concerning the manner in which this relationship shall be established. The drafters of earlier instruments were unanimous in including the requirement of express authorization by the sovereign, usually in writing, and this was still the case at the time of the Franco-German war of 1870-1871. Since the Hague Conferences, however, this condition is no longer considered essential. It is essential that there should be a "de facto" relationship between the resistance organization and the party to international law which is in a state of war, but the existence of this relationship is sufficient. It may find expression merely by tacit agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side the resistance organization is fighting. But affiliation with a Party to the conflict may also follow an official declaration': J. What the requirement therefore seeks to define is those persons taking part in hostilities during an international armed conflict on behalf of one of the states parties to the conflict (combatants), as distinguished from those individuals -regardless of whether they are fighting or partaking in some other form of violence -who are not (civilians). This is based on a reading of the last paragraph of Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 23 according to which all persons who are not combatants are necessarily civilians. This reading of Article 4, which prescribes a dichotomy of either being a combatant or a civilian during an international armed conflict, has been challenged by some commentators who advocate for a third category of individuals: the 'unlawful' or 'unprivileged' combatant. 24 Arguments concerning this third category of individuals do not affect the discussion concerning the 'belonging to a Party' requirement as 'unlawful' or 'unprivileged' combatants 'belong' to a state party to the conflict. They fail however to fulfil other criteria listed under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.
The requirement of 'belonging' thus excludes members of armed groups operating in the context of an international armed conflict, like the Rastas, from being afforded combatant status and, if they surrender or are captured, POW status. It also excludes those non-state actors who claim to be fighting for a just cause, but who have no agreement with a state party to the conflict that they are fighting on the state's behalf. Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I enlarges the notion of what entities may constitute a party to an international armed conflict beyond states to include 'peoples who are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination'. 25 However, this should not be confused with the requirement to 'belong to a Party' under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Whereas groups falling under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I style themselves as parties to the armed conflict, 'other' militias and volunteer groups under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention are not claiming themselves to be parties to the armed conflict, only that they are fighting for a party to the conflict. . In relation to the defendants' argument that they should be treated as POWs, the court found that it was not enough to determine whether El-Fatah could be considered an 'organized resistance movement'; it had to show that it was an 'organized resistance group that belong[ed] to a Party to the armed conflict '. 26 It is submitted that the requirement of 'belonging' is a necessarily low-threshold requirement, the purpose of which is to constitute the first of five criteria to apply to individuals forming irregular armed groups in the context of an international armed conflict to determine whether they are combatants and later, if necessary, POWs.
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It is a requirement designed to grant combatant status, and thus combatant's privilege, to those fighting for a state party to the conflict, or to trigger the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention governing the treatment of such individuals whilst interned as POWs.
The above argument for a low-threshold test for the requirement of 'belonging' for the purpose of classifying individuals under IHL, based on the commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, will meet its toughest challenge in practice where there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of states to want to make the requirements for attaining combatant status, and thus POW status, difficult to fulfil. This tendency derives from the desire of states to treat captured individuals as 'civilians' (and even so-called 'unlawful combatants'), who may be prosecuted for the simple fact of participating in hostilities, rather than POWs who have combatant privilege in the sense that it is lawful for them to participate in hostilities per se. 28 It is, however, submitted that this tendency of states may give way in practice to the equally strong desire of states for those fighting against them in an armed conflict to adhere to the applicable rules of IHL. States thus have an interest in encouraging individuals to respect IHL and thus to accord combatant privilege to those individuals who fulfil the requirements set out in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, including a low-threshold test of 'belonging'. The other 4 criteria listed under Art. 4A(2) Third Geneva Convention, supra note 1, are: '(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war'.
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'States have insisted that non-state actors fighting against a state be treated as either rebels or criminals, and that is why we have different rules for internal armed conflicts and international armed conflicts. Only soldiers fighting for the state in an international armed conflict are deemed to have the combatant's privilege, which is essentially a way of saying that it is not illegal for them to participate in hostilities. They have a right to use force -to use violence against enemy soldiers and enemy forces. Otherwise we could not wage war, which, of course, would be a terrible thing [sic] . So, for international humanitarian law, legal rights turn on combatant status. You are either fighting for a state or you are not': Whippman, supra note 16, at 701. In 1949, when the ink was dry on Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, it was uncontroversial that the purpose of the Article was to set out the requirements for attaining POW status. In the absence of a well-articulated definition of a 'combatant' to be found elsewhere, Article 4 also served, and continues to serve, as a reference point for the definition of a combatant. It would have been difficult in 1949 to imagine the requirements contained in Article 4 being used in any way other than for the purpose of classifying individuals in the context of international armed conflicts.
However, the unique factual situation which arose in the former Yugoslavia led international criminal law judges in the 1990s to look at Article 4 in a new light. The situation in the former Yugoslavia was not one of a direct state vs. state armed conflict lending itself to a straightforward application of Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; 29 the armed forces of one state were not fighting the armed forces of another state. Rather, the Bosnian armed forces were fighting a group who did not constitute the armed forces of Serbia, but who were heavily supported by that state. Thus while there was a direct armed conflict between Bosnian armed forces and an armed non-state actor, there was, on the other hand, an 'indirect' international armed conflict between the two states because of Serbia's support of the Bosnian Serb army (VRS). Could Serbia's support of the VRS render the armed conflict between Bosnia and the VRS 'international' and, if so, on what basis?
The ICTY turned to the Nicaragua case where the issue which had arisen before a different court, the ICJ, also was very loosely analogous insofar as the situation in Nicaragua also concerned the degree of involvement from an outside state in a series of events which transpired between an armed group and another state. In the context of this dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America, the ICJ had articulated a test for attributing the actions of individuals to a state, thereby resulting in the latter's responsibility, based on the notion of 'effective control' of a state over an armed group. The issues before the ICJ in the Nicaragua case were very different from those faced by the ICTY: the former was concerned with issues of state responsibility and did not have to classify an armed conflict; the latter was charged with addressing issues of individual criminal responsibility where the classification of the armed conflict was vital to determining the applicable law with which to try the accused. The ICTY nevertheless found the ICJ decision to be a stimulating precursor.
Whereas at the trial stage, the Chamber had found that 'effective control' had not been established, and thus the conflict could not be classified as international, 'effective control', establishing its own test by following a peculiar route. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, albeit setting out the requirements for the classification of individuals, was used by the ICTY Appeals Chamber as a roundabout way for it to reason that the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be classified as being international. One of the categories of combatants set out in Article 4, as discussed above, is that of an irregular armed group under Article 4A(2). While such an armed group does not constitute the 'armed forces' of a state party to the armed conflict, it is nevertheless deemed to be a group of 'combatants' if the group 'belongs to a Party' to the armed conflict. It was this 'belonging' requirement that the Appeals Chamber latched onto for the purpose of classifying the armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber reasoned that because the Bosnian Serbs 'belonged' to Serbia, there was an international armed conflict between two states.
However, when using the 'belonging to a Party' requirement for the purpose of classifying the armed conflict, rather than for the intended purpose of the Article (the classification of individuals in order to apply rules of IHL), the ICTY interpreted the requirement as demanding a higher threshold test than the mere 'de facto relationship' described above. The Appeals Chamber considered that what had to be established to demonstrate that the armed conflict was internationalized by Serbia's involvement was that Serbia exercised 'overall control' over the VRS to render the armed conflict between the VRS and Bosnia of an international character, and that this amount of 'overall control' was also sufficient for Serbia to incur state responsibility for the unlawful acts committed by members of this group. When discussing Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention the Appeals Chamber thus stated as follows:
States have in practice accepted that belligerents may use paramilitary units and other irregulars in the conduct of hostilities only on the condition that those belligerents are prepared to take responsibility for any infringements committed by such forces. In order for irregulars to qualify as lawful combatants, it appears that international rules and State practice therefore require control over them by a Party to an international armed conflict and, by the same token, a relationship of dependence and allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that Party to the conflict. These may then be regarded as the ingredients of the term 'belonging to a Party to the Conflict'. The Appeals Chamber thus considers that the Third Geneva Convention, by providing in Article 4 the requirement of 'belonging to a Party to the conflict', implicitly refers to a test of control.
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The Appeals Chamber thus considered that when an armed group was under the control of an a state to the effect that the state incurred responsibility for the unlawful acts carried out by members of this group, and the group in turn was dependent upon the state to which it held allegiance, this relationship could internationalize the conflict between the armed group and another state.
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Both praise and criticism may be levelled at the Appeals Chamber for its use of Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. The legal ingenuity with which the Chamber grappled with the complex factual situation before it led ultimately to a commendable 31 Ibid., at paras 94-95 (emphasis added).
Ibid., at para. 145.
at New York University on May 4, 2010 result: the articulation of a new test of 'overall control' for establishing when an otherwise non-international armed conflict becomes internationalized by the involvement of an outside state. This test, inspired by the reasoning of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, created a new understanding of inter-state armed conflicts which are fought indirectly though the support of an armed group by one state to engage in hostilities against the armed forces of another state.
The test developed by the ICTY for the purpose of classifying an otherwise internal conflict as international also led to an increased scope of application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and other rules of IHL applicable during international armed conflicts, thereby increasing the protection under IHL afforded to persons in armed conflict. The 'overall control' test has even gained restrained support from the ICJ when it noted in the Genocide case that the test enunciated by the ICTY may indeed be the 'applicable and suitable' test to apply for the purposes of evincing the 'internationalization' of an armed conflict. 33 However, there are three reasons why it is problematic that the Appeals Chamber considered that the same 'overall test' should also be used for the purpose of attributing state responsibility.
First, it mixes the distinct legal analysis of classifying an armed conflict as either international or non-international with the classification of individuals under IHL. Indeed, the classification of individuals under IHL can occur only once an armed conflict has been classified as international, as the categories of 'combatant', 'protected person' under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and 'civilian' more generally under the Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply in non-international armed conflicts. It is thus logically confusing to mix the two tests for the purpose of applying IHL alone.
Secondly, there seems to be have been an underlying assumption in the Tadić case that the test of 'belonging' for the purpose of classifying individuals under IHL must equate with the test for establishing state responsibility. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated, '[s] tates have in practice accepted that belligerents may use paramilitary units and other irregulars in the conduct of hostilities only on the condition that those belligerents are prepared to take responsibility for any infringements committed by such forces'. 34 The practice that the Tribunal alludes to does not include the ICRC commentary to Article 4A(2), which is dismissed as being too vague, 35 but rather consists only of the Israeli case of Kassem et al., 36 discussed infra. The force that drives the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber seems instead to be a general underlying assumption that state responsibility is incurred for the unlawful acts committed by individuals who 'belong' to a state party to an armed conflict, thereby rendering the conflict international.
37 This is curious reasoning.
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Ibid,, at para. 404.
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Ibid., at para. 94.
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'The authoritative ICRC Commentary does not shed much light on the matter, for it too is rather vague': ibid., at para. 93.
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Ibid.
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In the words of the Chamber, '[s] hould the conflict eventually be classified as international, it would inter alia follow that a foreign State may in certain circumstances be held responsible for violations of international law perpetrated by the armed groups acting on its behalf': ibid., at para. 97.
at New York University on May 4, 2010
Thirdly, by equating the 'belonging' requirement with the notion of 'control' exercised by a state over an armed group, the ICTY imported a higher threshold requirement for individuals seeking to attain combatant status and, if captured, POW status. The raising of the threshold for attaining these two statuses is contrary to the purpose of IHL which the Appeals Chamber so neatly set out in its judgment, namely that IHL 'is a realistic body of law, grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible'. 38 To require a demonstration of 'overall control' in order to establish that members of an armed group 'belong' to a party to the armed conflict makes it considerably more difficult for combatant status to be attained. This, in turn, acts as a deterrent for members of armed groups to adhere to the other requirements in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, in particular to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. 39 To discuss the 'belonging to a party' requirement in terms of demonstrating 'overall control' may thus reduce respect for IHL in practice.
The above critique of the Tadić decision should not, however, be read as suggesting that the tests developed by the ICJ concerning state responsibility should go unquestioned. Indeed, it is the role of scholars to examine and debate every legal development, and the reasons set out by Antonio Cassese for arguing why the 'overall control' test is more reflective of customary international law and thus more suitable than the 'effective control' test are perfectly in order, 40 as are contributions made by other scholars concerning the most suitable test for establishing state responsibility. 41 The above analysis of the Tadić decision is simply a critique of the ICTY Appeals Chamber approach of assuming that the content of different tests must be the same and consequently for mixing different tests developed for different purposes.
The Relationship between Combatant Status under Article 4A(2) and State Responsibility
The universality of international law does not require its content to be homogeneous. That different tests have been developed to apply to the relationship between a state and individuals who appear to act on behalf of that state is not problematic, given that these tests have different purposes. At the same time, this heterogeneity does not mean that international law is fragmented. Rather, the fact that different tests have been developed for different purposes simply means that each test should be applied pursuant to its purpose, and not pursuant to an unrelated purpose. This section will set out how the test of 'belonging' under IHL, for the purpose of classifying individuals, relates to the tests developed to establish the responsibility of a state. According to the at New York University on May 4, 2010 tests currently developed for the purpose of establishing state responsibility, in some instances a state may incur responsibility for the acts of individuals who 'belong' to it under IHL. In other instances, this will not be the case. This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first will examine the requirements for responsibility to be attributed to a state concerning acts committed by individuals who 'belong' to this same state. The second will then examine how a state may nevertheless incur responsibility for individuals who 'belong' to it on the basis of due diligence.
A Attributing Responsibility to a State for the Acts of Individuals Who 'Belong'
In the Tadić case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered the requirement of 'belonging to a party' under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention to equate with an attribution of state responsibility. According to the Appeals Chamber, as a result of a person being classified as a combatant under Article 4A(2), the unlawful acts or omissions of this person incur state responsibility.
The Chamber is not alone in making such an association. As evinced from the Tadić judgment, the ICTY relied heavily upon a domestic law case which made the same connection between the two different tests. In view . . . of the experience of the two World Wars, the nations of the world found it necessary to add the fundamental requirement of the total responsibility of Governments for the operations of irregular corps and thus ensure that there was someone to hold accountable if they did not act in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Israel-held Areas, Jerusalem, 1970 , reprinted in 42 ILR (1971 Ibid., at 476-477. 44 Ibid., at 477. The attribution tests under Articles 4 and 8 of the ILC's Draft Articles demand very different factual requirements from the 'overall control' test for establishing the existence of an indirect international armed conflict. It is not difficult to imagine an armed conflict deemed to be international by virtue of the 'overall control' exercised over an armed group by a state, for which no state responsibility is attributable under the ILC's Draft Articles for the unlawful acts committed by the armed group fighting on the state's behalf.
Indeed, in the Genocide case, the ICJ held that in the same armed conflict which was analysed in the Tadić case, the unlawful acts committed by the VRS in Srebrenica were not attributable to Serbia because there was no evidence that the VRS had acted as organs of Serbia or under its effective control or in accordance with its specific orders. Thus, the same situation, deemed by one international court (ICTY) to be an international armed conflict, was found by another international court (ICJ) not to lead to a finding of responsibility of Serbia, a party to the international armed conflict, on the basis of the rules of attribution.
Nor does the ICJ seem perplexed by this lack of attributing state responsibility for actions of individuals fighting on behalf of a state in some armed conflicts. The Court did not consider there to be anything logically problematic in applying one test for the purpose of attributing state responsibility and another, different, test for the purpose of classifying a conflict. It noted that:
The degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another State's territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of the involvement required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act in the course of the conflict.
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Genocide case, supra note 7, at 141, para. 393. It would be difficult -if not impossible -when applying the criterion of 'complete dependence' to demonstrate that a group of individuals are de facto state organs without showing that the group cannot exist autonomously without the support of the state, that is, that the group was created by the state and has never existed without its support: see Genocide case, at paras 392-395. On the difficulty of satisfying the 'complete dependence' test see Griebel and Plücken, 'New Developments Regarding the Rules of Attribution? The International Court of Justice's Decision in Bosnia v. Serbia', 21 Leiden J Int'l L (2008) 601, at 613. 48 Genocide case, supra note 7, at 143, para. 400. The test was first enunciated by the Court in the Nicaragua case, supra note 3, at 65, para. 115.
49
Genocide case, supra note 7, at 144, para. 405.
at New York University on May 4, 2010
Such a failure to prevent or repress violations stems from primary rules such as those in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I, or, for example, in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, where the responsibility Iran incurred for failing to fulfil its obligations to protect the premises of the US Embassy and its diplomatic and consular staff, and to protect the US Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, arose from a number of its treaty obligations. 57 Although the Court concluded that the militants who attacked the US Embassy and Consulates had no official status as recognized organs of the Iranian government, 58 this 'd[id] not mean that Iran [was] , in consequence, free of any responsibility in regard to those attacks; for its own conduct was in conflict with its international obligations'. 59 Iran was held in violation of its treaty obligations 'to take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the United States Embassy and Consulates' where, precisely, the attacks were 'successful because of lack of sufficient protection'.
60
Human rights treaties, which continue to apply during armed conflicts, have been interpreted as providing an obligation on states parties to prevent or repress human rights violations carried out by members of criminal groups or paramilitary groups, where there is no direct state involvement in the violations. In the American system, this obligation stems from the requirement to 'ensure' the exercise of human rights under Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 61 which provides, 'States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms'. could also be seen as establishing a standard of due diligence with regard to private players if the latter find themselves under the jurisdiction of a State, or even with regard to breaches of international humanitarian law by States and non-State actors abroad which could be influenced by a State. Ibid., at 29-30, paras 58 and 60. 59 Ibid., at 30, para. 61.
Ibid., at 30, paras 60-61. A more recent example from the ICJ jurisprudence is the finding that Serbia failed to prevent the Srebrenica genocide and to punish the perpetrators in the Genocide case, supra note 7. An example where states were held to have failed to exercise due diligence in breach of conventional obligations owed to a non-state actor is 
